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REVERSED ITEM BIAS: AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the recent methodological literature, various models have been proposed to account for 
the phenomenon that reversed items (defined as items for which respondents’ scores have to be 
recoded in order to make the direction of keying consistent across all items) tend to lead to 
problematic responses.  In this paper we propose an integrative conceptualization of three 
important sources of reversed item method bias (acquiescence, careless responding, and 
confirmation bias) and specify a multi-sample confirmatory factor analysis model with two 
method factors to empirically test the hypothesized mechanisms, using explicit measures of 
acquiescence and carelessness and experimentally manipulated versions of a questionnaire that 
varies three item arrangements and the keying direction of the first item measuring the focal 
construct.  We explain the mechanisms, review prior attempts to model reversed item bias, 
present our new model, and apply it to responses to a four-item self-esteem scale (N = 306) and 
the six-item Revised Life Orientation Test (N = 595).  Based on the literature review and the 
empirical results, we formulate recommendations on how to use reversed items in questionnaires. 
 
Key words: reverse-keyed items, method effects, response styles, survey research, structural 
equation modeling. 
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Reverse-keyed items are items for which respondents’ scores have to be recoded (i.e., 
reflected about the midpoint of the rating scale) in order for all the items in a multi-item scale to 
have the same directional relationship with the underlying construct of interest.  The use of 
reverse-keyed items (also called oppositely-keyed, reversed-polarity, reverse-worded, negatively 
worded, negatively-keyed, keyed-false, or simply reversed items) is sometimes recommended to 
disrupt non-substantive responding and to enable the detection and control of aberrant response 
behavior when it occurs (e.g., Nunnally, 1978, Chapter 15; Paulhus, 1991).   
However, research has shown that reversed items often lead to problems, particularly 
poor model fit of factor models (e.g., Marsh, 1986).  In some cases, the problem is not simply 
that the model based on the originally hypothesized substantive factor structure is found to be 
inadequate, but that the lack of fit stimulates the revision of a more parsimonious 
conceptualization and the specification of additional substantive factors.  For example, a 
unidimensional model in which high and low self-esteem are considered to be opposite poles of a 
single underlying continuum might be rejected in favor of a model in which separate, correlated 
factors are posited for positive and negative self-esteem corresponding to regular and reversed 
items (cf. Horan, DiStefano, & Motl, 2003; Motl & DiStefano, 2002).  
A variety of models have been proposed to take into account differences in responding to 
regular and reverse-keyed items and to avoid the mistaken specification of additional substantive 
factors, including models with method factors or correlated uniquenesses for either the regular or 
the reversed items or both (e.g., Tomás & Oliver, 1999).  Although these models generally 
achieve a better fit to the data than a model with only substantive factors, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between them based on statistical criteria, and the preferred model may differ in 
different applications (even when the same scale is analyzed).  Furthermore, the conceptual 
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meaning of the various methodological specifications from the perspective of the psychology of 
survey response typically remains unclear.  Often, researchers simply state that they are 
modeling method effects, mention several plausible mechanisms that could give rise to method 
effects in the discussion section (e.g., acquiescence, carelessness), or interpret the method effect 
in terms of a particular mechanism (e.g., acquiescence) without providing direct support that the 
proposed mechanism is actually at play.  Although some recent papers have tried to establish 
relationships between method effects and personality variables (e.g., DiStefano & Motl, 2009), 
research investigating the specific mechanisms that have been implicated in problematic 
responses to reversed items is rare.    
The goal of the present paper is to simultaneously consider three distinct mechanisms that 
could lead to method effects in response to items keyed in different directions and to propose an 
integrative model that takes into account and corrects for these extraneous influences.  Two of 
the mechanisms, (net) acquiescent responding and carelessness, both encourage response 
inconsistencies between regular and reversed items and can therefore result in correlated errors 
or the emergence of spurious factors.  The third mechanism, confirmation bias, leads to an 
upward or downward bias in respondents’ scores, depending on the keying direction of the first 
item measuring the focal construct.   
A multi-sample confirmatory factor-analytic specification combining experimental 
manipulation with response style measurement is proposed to model both (net) acquiescence and 
carelessness on the one hand and confirmation bias on the other hand as separate factors.  
Explicit measures of acquiescence (based on responses to a set of heterogeneous items different 
from the target items) and carelessness (in the second of two empirical studies) are used to 
separate acquiescence from carelessness.  Confirmation bias is modeled via a manipulation of 
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two item orders in the questionnaire, depending on the keying direction of the first item 
measuring the target construct.  The model is developed for a balanced scale with an equal 
number of regular and reverse-keyed items.  Importantly, three different arrangements of the 
items in the questionnaire are considered, which enables the consideration of moderator effects 
of item positioning.  In the grouped-alternated condition, related items are grouped together and 
regular and reverse-keyed items are alternated.  In the grouped-massed condition, the items are 
also grouped together, but the reverse-keyed items follow a block of regular items (or vice 
versa).  In the dispersed scale, the items are spread throughout the questionnaire, with unrelated 
buffer items spaced between the target items.  These item arrangements are commonly observed 
in surveys.  Hypotheses are developed to evaluate the effects of item positioning on response 
behavior under the three mechanisms.  The proposed model is tested in two empirical studies in 
which 306 U.K. adults responded to a balanced four-item self-esteem scale and 595 U.S. adults 
responded to a balanced six-item optimism scale.  Based on the findings and prior results, 
recommendations are formulated on how to use reversed items in questionnaires.   
MECHANISMS LEADING TO REVERSED ITEM MISRESPONSE 
In this section we discuss three mechanisms that can result in reversed item misresponse.  
The term reversed item misresponse is used in a general sense to refer to systematic differences 
in response to regular and reverse-keyed items (cf. Swain, Weathers, & Niedrich, 2008).  
Assuming that regular and reversed items are roughly equivalent indicators of the construct of 
interest except for the direction of keying, keying-related differences in response reflect a 
method effect (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  As discussed below, this method effect may be due to 
(net) acquiescence, carelessness, or confirmation bias, and it will result in response 
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inconsistencies between regular and reversed items (e.g., double agreement or disagreement to 
an item and its opposite for net acquiescence and carelessness) or differences in mean response 
depending on the keying direction of the first item (for confirmation bias).   
Acquiescence, disacquiescence and net acquiescence.  We define acquiescence 
(disacquiescence) as a preference for the positive (negative) side of the rating scale.  When a 
Likert format is used for the response scale, this means that a respondent has a tendency to agree 
(disagree) with items regardless of content (Paulhus, 1991).  In the model of the survey response 
process developed by Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski (2000), which distinguishes between the 
stages of comprehension (attending to the question and interpreting it), retrieval (generating a 
retrieval strategy and then retrieving relevant beliefs from memory), judgment (integrating the 
information into a judgment), and response (mapping the judgment onto the response categories 
and answering the question), acquiescence affects the final stage (response), as it reflects 
individual differences in scale usage unrelated to content. 
In prior research, acquiescence (disacquiescence) has been assessed in two distinct ways 
(Martin, 1964).  One method is based on simultaneous (dis)agreement with regular and reversed 
items (i.e., endorsement of contradictory statements).  The other method is based on consistent 
agreement with many heterogeneous items (i.e., items that vary widely in content and therefore 
are unlikely to share common content).  Although acquiescence, defined as a preference for the 
agree positions on a Likert rating scale, may lead to self-contradictory responses, other 
mechanisms can have the same effect.  Therefore, in order to distinguish between different 
processes, we will measure acquiescence using the second approach.  Net acquiescence 
combines acquiescence and disacquiescence into a single index, and it can be assessed as a 
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person’s mean response across many heterogeneous items.  Defined in this way, it is basically a 
measure of directional (positive or negative) bias (Hui & Triandis, 1985).   
Since acquiescence is a form of responding not based on content, which influences the 
final stage of the response process when respondents select one of the response options provided, 
different arrangements of the items in the questionnaire should have no differential effect on 
acquiescent responding.  In particular, acquiescence should be evident regardless of whether 
items are grouped together (in either a grouped-alternated or grouped-massed sequence) or 
dispersed throughout the questionnaire.   
Careless responding to reverse-keyed items.  The term careless responding is sometimes 
used very broadly to refer to any type of random or nonrandom response to survey questions that 
is not based on content (see Meade & Craig, 2012, for a recent example).  From a psychological 
perspective, such a broad conception of careless responding is problematic because many 
different mechanisms could lead to responding that is not sufficiently sensitive to content.  
Following Schmitt and Stults (1985) and Woods (2006), we restrict the term careless responding 
to situations in which respondents are inattentive to reverse-keyed items.  Specifically, 
respondents may form expectations about what is being measured in a questionnaire and respond 
to individual items based on their overall position concerning the focal issue, rather than specific 
item content.  This can occur in two ways.  First, the instructions may tell respondents what the 
researcher is interested in, or a heading or label might be used to organize the items in the 
questionnaire.  Second, related items may be grouped together and a respondent might infer what 
construct is being measured, even if the construct is not identified explicitly.  If respondents 
answer the survey based on their expectations about what the questionnaire is trying to assess, 
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rather than specific item content, they may not notice that some of the items are reverse-keyed 
and thus respond inconsistently to regular and reversed items. 
Although careless (or inattentive) responding to reverse-keyed items has the same effect 
as acquiescence (i.e., it leads to a response inconsistency between regular and reversed items), 
the problem occurs at the initial (comprehension) stage of the survey response process, not at the 
final (response) stage.  Another difference is that, since the response is based on expectations 
cued by the instructions or previous items, the degree of response inconsistency should depend 
on the arrangement of the items in the questionnaire.  Careless responding should be more 
pronounced when related items are grouped together, particularly if a block of items keyed in the 
same direction precedes an item keyed in the opposite direction (i.e., in the grouped-massed 
condition), because top-down processing is encouraged by this type of item arrangement.  In 
contrast, when multiple measures of the same construct are dispersed throughout the 
questionnaire and mixed with other, unrelated items, respondents are less likely to form an 
expectation that all items are alike and careless responding should be reduced.  It is not entirely 
clear what will happen in the grouped-alternated condition.  Even though item grouping is in 
principle conducive to top-down processing, a single item may not be sufficient to induce the 
expectation that subsequent items are keyed in the same direction, especially if the keying 
direction of the second item is opposite to that of the first item.   
Confirmation bias.  Confirmation bias refers to the phenomenon that when respondents 
answer a question, they tend to activate beliefs that are consistent with the way in which the item 
is stated (Davies, 2003; Kunda et al., 1993).  For example, if respondents are asked whether they 
are extraverted, they will tend to think of situations in which they were extraverted, whereas 
when they are asked whether they are introverted, they will tend to bring to mind situations in 
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which they were introverted.  As a consequence, they will rate themselves as higher in 
extraversion when the question asks about extraversion.  Prior research has shown that 
confirmation bias is due to a positive test strategy, where respondents primarily retrieve 
information supporting the question, although the generation of confirming evidence may also 
inhibit the production of disconfirming evidence (Davies, 2003).    
In a survey context, split-ballot studies, in which respondents are randomly assigned to 
one of two versions of an item that are exact opposites of each other, show that responses tend to 
be biased in the direction in which the item is worded (e.g., McClendon, 1991; Schuman & 
Presser, 1981).  Although this finding has been explained in terms of acquiescence, it could also 
be due to confirmation bias and a positive test strategy.  If respondents answer a single question, 
it is not possible to distinguish between these two possibilities.  However, let us assume that one 
group of respondents is exposed to a statement such as “I tend to be talkative” followed by the 
opposite statement “I tend to be quiet”, whereas another group of respondents indicates their 
agreement or disagreement with the two statements in the reverse order.  A within-person 
inconsistency in response (simultaneous agreement or disagreement with both statements) would 
indicate acquiescence or maybe careless responding.   However, it is possible that participants 
respond consistently to the two items, but those in the first order indicate greater extraversion 
than those in the second order.  Such a response pattern would reflect confirmation bias.  In 
contrast to acquiescence and careless responding, confirmation bias occurs at the retrieval stage 
of the response process.  
Confirmation bias has usually been studied for single items and evidence in support of 
the effect is obtained by comparing responses across participants, so little is known about how it 
will affect participants’ responses to multiple items (both regular and reversed) measuring the 
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same construct.  We assume that when related items are grouped together, respondents are 
unlikely to retrieve information consistent with the way in which the item is stated for each item 
separately.  If the survey starts out with a question about being talkative, the response will 
depend on the extent to which respondents can retrieve situations in which they were talkative.  
An immediately following question about being quiet will not lead to the biased retrieval of 
instances in which the respondent was quiet because of satisficing (i.e., minimizing the effort 
expended on answering the questionnaire; Krosnick, 1991).  Instead, the belief sample available 
based on the previous question will carry over to the second item, and responses will be biased in 
the direction of the first item (extraversion).  On the other hand, if the first item is about being 
quiet, information related to being quiet will be retrieved and this information will carry over to 
subsequent items, even if they are keyed in the opposite direction.  Therefore, responses will be 
biased in the direction of introversion.  Overall, we expect that when the first item is reverse-
keyed, the mean response to all items (after recoding reversed items) will be lower than when the 
first item is non-reversed.   
Although confirmation bias should occur in both the grouped-alternated and grouped-
massed conditions, it might be stronger in the latter case (i.e., when a reversed item follows a 
block of items keyed in the non-reversed direction) because the tendency to use a positive test 
strategy may be reinforced in this situation. On the other hand, when related items are dispersed 
throughout the questionnaire and separated by buffer items, which tend to activate unrelated 
content, carryover effects will be reduced.  When respondents eventually encounter a reversed 
item, they may have to retrieve relevant information again, which is then biased in the direction 
in which the question is stated.  Therefore, the differential biases induced by regular and reversed 
items should offset each other (i.e., upward bias for regular items and downward bias for 
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reversed items after recoding reversed items), and there should be no effect of the keying of the 
first item on the mean response to all items in the dispersed condition. 
Summary.  Our framework distinguishes three sources of reversed item bias: (net) 
acquiescence, careless responding to reversed items, and confirmation bias.  Acquiescence and 
careless responding are expected to increase response inconsistency between regular and 
reversed items, in the sense that respondents’ scores on observed measures (prior to recoding) 
will be uniformly elevated or depressed regardless of keying differences between the items. 
Confirmation bias will not lead to response inconsistency, but scores on regular items should be 
lower and scores on reversed items should be higher (prior to recoding) if a reversed rather than 
a regular item appears first in the questionnaire, because the first item biases memory retrieval in 
the direction in which the initial item is worded.   
The manipulation of different ways in which the items are positioned in a questionnaire 
also allows us to consider the moderator effects of item arrangement.  For net acquiescence, we 
do not expect differences in misresponse as a function of item positioning.  However, the effect 
of careless responding on inconsistency bias and the effect of the manipulation of the keying 
direction of the first item on confirmation bias should be strongest in the grouped-massed 
condition and weakest in the dispersed condition.           
MODELING METHOD EFFECTS IN THE PRESENCE OF REVERSE-KEYED ITEMS 
There are many potential sources of method bias in survey research (for a review see 
Podsakoff et al., 2003).  Our focus here is on one such source, item keying.  Several models have 
been proposed to control for the biasing influence of item keying, and we will present a brief 
review of prior research before developing our own integrative model.  We structure our review 
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along the following dimensions.  We first distinguish between models using method factors and 
models using correlated uniquenesses to account for keying differences between items.  Within 
the method factor approaches, we further distinguish between (a) method factors affecting all 
items or specific subsets of items, (b) method factors with freely estimated or constrained 
loadings, and (c) models with or without specifically designed indicators or antecedents of the 
method factor(s).  We also describe the major findings and some limitations of previous research. 
The specification of method factors to account for keying differences 
A method factor is a latent variable assumed to contribute to the variability of a set of 
observed response variables that share a common method.  Two types of method factors have 
been considered in the context of responses to regular and reversed items: a general method 
factor that underlies all observed variables (with uniformly positive loadings for all items, 
provided reversed items have not been recoded) and a method factor (possibly multiple method 
factors) for subsets of items.  In the latter case, researchers have specified method factors for the 
regular items, reverse-keyed items, or both.   
Models with a general method factor underlying all items.  Several authors have 
considered a model with a single substantive factor (with positive or negative loadings for 
regular and reversed items, assuming reversed items have not been recoded) and a single method 
factor which influences both the regular and reversed items.  The loadings on the method factor 
are set to one if the variance of the method factor is freely estimated, or they are constrained to 
be equal if the variance of the method factor is set to one (see Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al., 2003, 
for an example).  This model is a special case of the random intercept model proposed by 
Maydeu-Olivares and Coffman (2006), and it is shown in Panel A of Figure 1.  
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
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 The model with uniform positive loadings on a single, general method factor has also 
been applied to regular and reversed items measuring multiple substantive constructs (e.g., 
Billiet & McClendon, 2000).  If multiple substantive factors are included, it is not necessary to 
constrain the loadings on the method factor to be equal and these loadings can be freely 
estimated (e.g., Levin & Montag, 1989).  An example is shown in panel B of Figure 1.  
Operationally, this model is similar to a bifactor model in which the method factor is the general 
factor and the substantive factors are the sub-factors, although the substantive factors are allowed 
to be correlated (which is feasible since the signs of the loadings for the substantive and method 
factors differ). 
Models with method factors for subsets of items.  Some authors have entertained models 
for a single substantive construct in which a method factor with freely estimated loadings is 
specified for either the regular or reversed items (but not both).  Illustrative examples are 
contained in Tomás and Oliver (1999).  This specification is a special case of the so-called 
correlated trait, correlated method minus one or CTC(M-1) model when only one trait is 
available and either the reverse-keyed items or the regular items serve as the reference factor 
(Geiser et al., 2008).  The model can be extended to several substantive factors or situations 
where the same substantive factor is measured repeatedly over time, in which case the 
longitudinal invariance of the substantive and method factors can be investigated (e.g., Motl & 
DiStefano, 2002).  Panels C and D in Figure 1 show examples of models with one or two 
substantive factors and a method factor for the reversed items.  
If there is a single substantive construct and separate uncorrelated method factors are 
specified for the regular and reversed items (with method factor loadings freely estimated), this 
model is a special case of the bifactor model in which the substantive construct is the general 
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factor and the method factors are the sub-factors (see panel E of Figure 1).  It is also possible to 
allow the method factors to be correlated and an example of this specification is provided in 
Tomás and Oliver (1999).  If there are multiple correlated substantive factors and separate 
correlated method factors are included for the regular and reversed items, the model is an 
application of the general correlated trait correlated method (CTCM) model (panel F of Figure 1; 
see Harris & Bladen, 1994, for an example).   
Explicit correlates of method factors.  Usually, the method factor is not directly related to 
a specific variable designed to explicitly capture the particular method effect in question.  
Exceptions are the papers by Watson (1992) and Billiet and McClendon (2000).  Watson calls 
the method factor an acquiescence factor, which is indicated by an explicit acquiescence index 
(computed as the extent of strong agreement with seven control items) and which is also related 
to a measure of education.  In the study by Billiet and McClendon (2000), a general style factor 
on which all indicators of two substantive constructs load equally is related to an explicit 
agreement index (computed as the sum of agreements with 14 items) as well as age and 
education (see Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al., 2003, for a similar approach).  Marsh (1986) showed 
that the consistency of children’s responses to a self-concept instrument containing both regular 
and reversed items was positively related to grade level and that for fifth-graders a method factor 
based on the reversed items was substantially correlated with reading achievement (see also 
Marsh, 1996).  This implies that reversed items may be especially problematic in research with 
children and other respondents who have relatively low verbal ability.        
The specification of correlated uniquenesses to account for keying differences 
Method effects have also been modeled via correlated uniquenesses.  As implied by the 
name, in this model the unique factors (error terms) associated with items that share a common 
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method are allowed to be correlated.  Under certain circumstances, models with method factors 
and correlated uniquenesses can yield identical model fits, but in general the correlated 
uniqueness model is both more restrictive (method effects corresponding to regular and reversed 
items are assumed to be independent) and less restrictive (method effects are not assumed to be 
unidimensional) than some method factor models.  Although correlated uniqueness models have 
been shown to be less susceptible to convergence problems, it is difficult to relate method effects 
to direct measures or other variables of interest.  As in the case of method factors, correlated 
uniquenesses can be specified for the regular items, for the reversed items, or for both (for 
examples see Marsh, 1996, and Tomás & Oliver, 1999; for a discussion of the consequences of 
including correlated uniquenesses for only some but not all of the methods see Cole, Ciesla, & 
Steiger, 2007).  
Summary of prior findings modeling method effects due to keying differences 
The following conclusions have emerged from research on method effects caused by the 
use of reverse-keyed items based on the models distinguished in the previous sections.  First, 
models in which method effects are included generally yield a much better fit to the data than 
models in which only substantive factors are included.  Second, it is often difficult to clearly 
distinguish between different method effect specifications on the basis of statistical criteria, 
because different models of method effects fit about equally well.  Third, the psychological 
processes causing method effects are frequently left unspecified, or researchers merely speculate 
about possible reasons for method effects in the discussion section.  Several papers have used 
explicit measures of acquiescence to validate the interpretation of the method factor as an 
acquiescence factor (e.g., Billiet & McClendon, 2000).  However, the acquiescence indices used 
in these studies are sometimes problematic, because due to data limitations the items on which 
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the acquiescence indices are based overlap to a great deal with the items used as indicators of the 
method factor.  Furthermore, the indices do not contain a large number of regular or reversed 
items measuring the same construct and/or the items are not heterogeneous in content (both of 
which are prerequisites for a good acquiescence measure).  To unambiguously validate the 
meaning of the method factor, it is necessary to correlate the method factor with an independent 
and reliable direct measure of the method effect of interest (e.g., acquiescence).   
Finally, although method factors have been related to a variety of other psychological 
constructs, the choice of these other constructs often seems somewhat ad hoc.  For example, in 
DiStefano and Motl (2009), social desirability, behavioral inhibition and activation, fear of 
negative evaluation, self-monitoring, and self-consciousness were studied as antecedents of a 
reverse-keyed item factor.  It is not entirely clear why these specific constructs were studied as 
antecedents of method effects, and it would seem to be useful to investigate more immediate 
antecedents of method effects.  Little or no research has studied method factors as a function of 
experimentally manipulated task characteristics such as different arrangements of the items in a 
questionnaire.  
AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF SURVEY RESPONSE TO  
REGULAR AND REVERSED ITEMS 
In this section we propose a model representing the response process to sets of items 
varying in keying direction as a function of different arrangements of these items in the 
questionnaire.  This model has three characteristic features.  First, it incorporates three distinct 
mechanisms – (net) acquiescence, careless responding to reversed items, and confirmation bias – 
that have been shown to influence responses to regular and reversed items.  Second, the model 
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distinguishes between two types of method effects, response inconsistency between regular and 
reversed items and difference in mean response depending on whether the first item measuring 
the focal construct is a regular or reversed item.  Acquiescence and careless responding are 
assumed to lead to the former, confirmation bias to the latter.  In order to distinguish between 
acquiescence and careless responding, an explicit (net) acquiescence index (based on the extent 
of agreement with unrelated control items) and a direct proxy measure of careless responding are 
specified as antecedents of the response inconsistency factor.  Confirmation bias is modeled as 
the difference in mean response to regular and reversed items by respondents who encounter 
either a regular or reversed item first (which requires a between-participant manipulation of 
whether a regular or reversed measure of the focal construct appears first in the questionnaire).  
Third, the model is developed as a multi-sample specification in order to represent different 
experimentally manipulated item arrangements in the questionnaire (grouped-alternated, 
grouped-massed, and dispersed), which enables the consideration of moderator effects of item 
positioning on misresponse in surveys.   
Figure 2 depicts the proposed model graphically.  For simplicity, we assume that there is 
a single focal construct, which is measured by 3 regular (non-reversed) and 3 reversed items.  
The regular items are denoted as p1, p2, and p3 (p for positive), the reversed items as n1, n2, and 
n3 (n for negative).  Reversed items have not been recoded, which means that the loadings on the 
substantive factor (ξ) are positive for regular and negative for reversed items; otherwise, the 
substantive loadings are freely estimated.  Of course, the model can be easily extended to 
multiple substantive constructs and more items.   
– Insert Figure 2 about here – 
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The responses to the six items are modeled as a function of the substantive construct, 
denoted by ξ, one unique factor per item (εp1, εp2, εp3, εn1, εn2, εn3) and two method factors (η1, 
η2) .  The substantive construct and unique factors conform to the usual confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) specification (Mulaik, 2009).  In addition, we specify two method factors.  The 
first method factor (η1) models inconsistency in response to regular and reversed items 
(inconsistency bias).  This is reflected in the fact that it has positive unit loadings for all items, 
regardless of their keying direction (remember that reversed items have not been recoded).  To 
distinguish acquiescence from careless responding, the response inconsistency factor is regressed 
on an explicit measure of net acquiescence called NARS for net acquiescence response style 
(with regression weight γNARS) and a proxy measure of careless responding called IMC for 
Instructional Manipulation Check (with regression weight γIMC); the residual term of this 
regression is denoted as Z.  The idea underlying IMC will be explained in the context of Study 2.  
The second method factor (η2) captures confirmation bias.  Regular items have a positive 
unit loading on the confirmation bias factor, reversed items have a negative unit loading.  In 
order to capture confirmation bias, respondents have to be randomly assigned to conditions in 
which the first item measuring the focal construct is either a regular or reversed item (so the first 
item in the scale is either p1, a regular item, or n1, a reverse-keyed item).  A dummy variable 
(denoted as ‘First item reversed’ or FIR) is used to code the two conditions (1 for respondents 
who encounter a reversed item first, 0 otherwise).  The confirmation bias factor is regressed on 
the ‘First item reversed’ dummy variable (with weight γConfbias) and has no residual variance 
(which, although not necessary under all conditions, facilitates model identification and 
convergence).  The proposed specification is equivalent to directly regressing the observed items 
on the ‘First item reversed’ dummy variable and fixing the regression weights to be equal across 
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items (with a negative or positive sign for the regular and reversed items, respectively).  
However, the model in Figure 2 more clearly conveys the meaning of the confirmation bias 
factor and can be easily implemented with standard software. 
No covariances are shown between the exogenous variables ξ (the substantive construct), 
NARS, IMC, and FIR.  Since respondents are randomly assigned to the ‘First item reversed’ 
conditions, the dummy variable should be unrelated to the other exogenous variables. The 
remaining variables could be correlated.  It is an empirical question whether these covariances 
are necessary, although a conceptual rationale should be provided if an association is to be 
introduced. 
Figure 2 does not explicitly show that the model is formulated as a multi-sample 
specification, but this is assumed.  Specifically, respondents are randomly assigned to conditions 
in which all items measuring the construct of interest are grouped together or dispersed 
throughout the questionnaire, separated by unrelated buffer items.  In the grouped conditions, the 
substantive items are arranged in an alternating order based on keying direction (in the grouped-
alternated condition) or a block of regular (reversed) items is followed by several reversed 
(regular) items (in the grouped-massed condition).  For example, in our empirical studies, four 
items keyed in the same direction are followed by two or three items keyed in the opposite 
direction.  Further details are provided in the context of the empirical studies. 
In terms of the method effect specifications discussed earlier, our model is most similar 
to Billiet and McClendon (2000) and Welkenhuysen-Gybels et al. (2003), and because of the unit 
loadings on the inconsistency bias factor across all items, it can be considered as a random 
intercept factor model (Maydeu-Olivares & Coffman, 2006).  However, the model is more 
general because acquiescence is distinguished from careless responding, confirmation bias is 
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taken into account, and an extension to a multi-sample context is considered so that the 
moderating effect of different item arrangements on the three response mechanisms can be 
investigated.   
STUDY 1 
 In the first study, we conducted an initial test of the proposed model based on a four-item 
self-esteem scale with two regular and two reversed items. In this study, we do not have an 
explicit measure of careless responding, and we interpret the residual Z of the response 
inconsistency factor (after accounting for NARS) as a proxy for careless responding.  
Method  
We collected the data from the UK online panel of a European panel provider, for an 
effective sample size of N = 306.  Respondents were randomly sampled from the panel, which is 
representative of the general population.  The average age of the respondents was 46 (Min = 12; 
Max = 69; SD = 12.4), 51 percent of respondents were female, and 43 percent had a higher 
education, where higher education refers to formal education (college or university) beyond 
secondary school. 
The focal construct in this study was self-esteem, which was measured with two regular 
items (formulated in the high self-esteem direction) and two reversed items: ‘Generally speaking, 
I feel pleased with myself’ (p1); ‘On the whole, I feel satisfied with myself’ (p2); ‘Generally 
speaking, I feel annoyed with myself’ (n1); and ‘On the whole, I feel frustrated with myself’ 
(n2).  These items are similar to those found in the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1965).  For the grouped-massed conditions, we wrote two additional regular or reversed items: 
‘Overall, I take a positive attitude toward myself’ (p3) and ‘Generally speaking, I feel good 
19 
 
 
about myself’ (p4), or ‘Overall, I take a negative attitude toward myself’ (n3) and ‘Generally 
speaking, I feel bad about myself’ (n4).  These additional items were not included in the model 
specification; the purpose of these items was simply to simulate a situation in which several 
items keyed in the same direction lead respondents to expect a common keying direction.  All 
items were rated on 7-point Likert scales with categories labeled (1) Fully disagree, (2) Disagree, 
(3) Slightly disagree, (4) Neutral, (5) Slightly agree, (6) Agree, (7) Fully agree.   
We randomly assigned respondents to one of six conditions using a 3 (type of item 
arrangement: grouped-alternated, grouped-massed, or dispersed) by 2 (keying direction of the 
first focal item: regular or reversed) experimental design.  In the grouped-alternated conditions 
(N = 106), the regular and reversed self-esteem items were presented in an alternating order 
(either p1, n1, p2, n2 or n1, p1, n2, p2, depending on the keying direction of the first item).  In 
the grouped-massed conditions (N = 96), four regular items preceded two reversed items (p1, p2, 
p3, p4, n1, n2) or four reversed items preceded two regular items (n1, n2, n3, n4, p1, p2).  In 
both the grouped-alternated and grouped-massed conditions, the focal self-esteem items (which 
were always shown on the same page) were preceded and followed by a total of 48 filler items; 
these were used to construct the NARS index.  In the dispersed conditions (N = 104), only one 
self-esteem item was shown on a given page (which was always the first item on the page) and 
the individual self-esteem items were separated by 12 buffer items.  As in the grouped 
conditions, the first focal item in the dispersed conditions was either a regular or reversed item.   
The buffer items included to measure net acquiescence were deliberately very diverse in 
content as they were randomly sampled from existing scales and questionnaires.  Examples of 
buffer items were ‘I think quantitative information is difficult to understand’, ‘Fashion is 
irrelevant’, ‘I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance of my getting 
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emotionally involved’, and ‘When I go shopping, I find myself spending very little time 
checking out new products and brands.’  To construct the NARS measure, we computed the 
average score across the 48 unrelated buffer items (Min = 1.85, Max = 5.04, M = 3.51, SD = .53, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .83).  The resulting index indicates a person’s tendency to agree or disagree 
with items regardless of specific item content (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001). In order to 
investigate the effect of confirmation bias, we formed a dummy variable called ‘First item 
reversed’ (FIR) based on the manipulation of the keying direction for the first item (coded 1 for 
respondents who encountered a reversed self-esteem item first and 0 otherwise). 
Results 
As the data were approximately normally distributed (all endogenous observed variables 
had skewness and kurtosis values between –1 and +1) and no missing values occurred, we fit the 
model to the data using multi-group structural equation modeling with the ML estimator, using 
MPlus 6.1.  The means, standard deviations and correlations of the observed variables, as well as 
details about the specification of the model, are provided in the supplemental notes for this 
paper.   
We initially estimated a one-factor model for the three groups defined by item 
arrangement condition using only the four self-esteem items, with one substantive factor (self-
esteem) underlying the four observed variables and all estimated parameters unconstrained 
across the three groups.  This model fit very poorly (χ2 (6) = 153.81, p < .0001; RMSEA = .491; 
CFI = .839; TLI = .518), and the sizable modification indices for the covariances among the 
unique factors suggested the presence of reversed item bias.   
We then specified the model shown in Figure 2, except that there were only four 
endogenous observed variables (instead of six) and no direct measure of careless responding was 
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available (i.e., the model does not include IMC).  The loadings on the substantive factor were 
freely estimated except for one unit loading for the marker item (with positive loadings for the 
regular items and negative loadings for the reversed items), but the loadings on the inconsistency 
and confirmation bias factors were set to unity (as indicated in Figure 2).  Model comparison 
tests for the substantive loadings across the three item arrangement conditions showed that the 
loadings did not differ across groups, so they were set invariant across conditions.  The 
exogenous variables of self-esteem, NARS, and FIR were initially specified to be uncorrelated, 
but the modification indices for the covariance between self-esteem and NARS were substantial 
in each group and the model was therefore revised to incorporate this covariance.  The resulting 
negative correlation between self-esteem and NARS is consistent with findings that low status 
individuals and respondents with lower education and lower income (which should also have 
lower self-esteem) show more acquiescence (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001).    
Our hypotheses imply that the effect of NARS on inconsistency bias will be invariant 
across the three item arrangement conditions, whereas the effect of carelessness on inconsistency 
bias and the effect of the keying direction of the first target item (FIR) on confirmation bias 
should depend on the positioning of the items in the questionnaire.  To test these hypotheses, we 
conducted invariance tests of the relevant parameters (γNARS, σ²Z, and γConfbias).  In support of the 
first prediction, γNARS did not differ across groups (∆χ2 (2) = .87, n.s.).  We do not have an 
explicit measure of carelessness in this study, but if the residual in the inconsistency bias factor 
(σ²Z) is interpreted as a proxy measure for careless responding, the findings support the predicted 
lack of invariance of the effect of careless responding across the item arrangement conditions 
(∆χ2 (2) = 16.75, p < .001).  Contrary to predictions, γConfbias did not differ across groups (∆χ2 (2) 
= 2.44, n.s.).  The final model, in which γNARS and γConfbias were specified to be invariant across 
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item arrangement conditions but the residual variance of the inconsistency bias factor was freely 
estimated (see the supplemental notes for details of the model specification), fit well: χ2 (31) = 
40.98, p = .11; RMSEA = .056 (90% C.I. 0.000 – 0.099); SRMR = .054; CFI = .990; TLI = .986.  
The estimation results (including 95 percent confidence intervals) are shown in Table 1.  
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
The findings indicate that NARS significantly affects the inconsistency bias factor (γNARS 
= .17, p < .01) and the effect does not vary by item arrangement.  Both results are in line with our 
predictions.  The variance of Z (the residual variance of the inconsistency bias factor after 
accounting for NARS) is significant in all conditions (p < .05), and the effect differs across 
groups, with substantially less variance in the dispersed condition (σ²Z  = .10) than in the 
grouped-alternated (σ²Z = .17) and especially the grouped-massed (σ²Z = .37) conditions.  If one 
interprets the residual in the inconsistency bias factor (after accounting for NARS) as a proxy for 
the careless responding effect, these findings support our predictions.  Finally, our data show 
evidence of confirmation bias since respondents reported somewhat lower self-esteem if the first 
item was reversed (γConfbias = -.29, p < .05).  Since the estimated parameter does not differ by 
item arrangement, the hypothesis that confirmation bias would primarily emerge in the grouped 
conditions was not supported.     
To assess the relative contribution of the various factors to observed item scores, we 
applied variance decomposition, separately for regular and reversed items (i.e., averaging across 
the two regular and two reversed items).  Because of the negative covariance between NARS and 
self-esteem, the variance for the regular items contains a negative term, which creates problems 
for the variance partitioning, but the negative terms are small and the variance decomposition 
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does provide useful insights.  The results are reported in Table 2 (including 95 percent 
confidence intervals).  It is reassuring that most of the observed variance is accounted for by the 
construct of interest.  Also, although the effect of NARS is statistically significant, NARS 
contributes a negligible amount to the variance in observed scores.  Similarly, the effect of 
positioning a reversed item first (confirmation bias) is statistically significant but very small.  An 
interesting finding is that in the grouped-massed condition a substantial portion of the variance in 
observed scores is accounted for by careless responding (assuming that the residual of the 
inconsistency bias factor can be interpreted as a proxy for careless responding).  In fact, in the 
grouped-massed condition careless responding is the second most important contributor to item 
variance after the target construct, self-esteem.  In contrast, in the dispersed condition careless 
responding is a much less important variance component.  However, the unique variances of the 
items are much larger in that case.  These findings suggest that while the item arrangement in the 
grouped-massed condition increases systematic error (greater inconsistency bias), dispersing 
items throughout the questionnaire leads to greater non-systematic (random) error. 
– Insert Table 2 about here – 
STUDY 2 
Although we believe that the model tested in the first study provides useful insights into 
the phenomenon of reversed item bias, four limitations should be pointed out.  First, we do not 
have direct evidence for the interpretation of the residual of the inconsistency bias factor as 
careless responding.  The moderating effect of item arrangement is consistent with our 
hypothesis that careless responding should be strongest in the grouped-massed condition and 
therefore supports this interpretation, but it would be useful to have a direct measure of careless 
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responding.  Second, the self-esteem scale used in Study 1 was not an established instrument, 
there were only four items, and the items were probably more similar in wording than the items 
found in many personality and attitude scales.  Third, we used an ad hoc measure of net 
acquiescent responding by randomly selecting presumably unrelated items from different scales 
found in the literature.  Finally, the sample size for the study was relatively small.  
To address these limitations, we conducted another study in which we used an established 
measure of another substantive construct, optimism (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994), based on 
three regular and three reversed items.  We also included different filler items to construct our 
index of net acquiescent responding (NARS), and we collected data from a larger sample of 
respondents in the U.S.  In addition, we extended the original model by adding a direct measure 
of carelessness.  Specifically, we propose the use of an Instructional Manipulation Check (IMC) 
as an explicit proxy indicator of careless responding.  As described by Oppenheimer, Meyvis, 
and Davidenko (2009), an IMC consists of a question embedded in the questionnaire that is 
similar to the other questions in terms of length and response format (e.g., Likert scale), but 
differs from the other questions in that participants are asked to ignore the standard response 
format and instead provide an indication that they paid attention to the specific wording of the 
question (e.g., “For this statement, please do not check a response option, but simply click on the 
continue button below”).  Since careless responding is based on top-down processing cued by 
respondent expectations about what construct is being assessed, IMC is expected to capture 
careless or inattentive responding to reversed items. 
Method 
We collected the data from the Amazon Mechanical Turk panel (see Goodman, Cryder, & 
Cheema, forthcoming, for an evaluation of Mechanical Turk participants).  We set a target response 
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rate of 600 completed questionnaires, and the survey remained active for 12 days until this target 
was reached.  Because of missing data, the final effective sample size was N = 595.  A small 
monetary incentive was used to encourage participation, and respondents spent an average of 4 
minutes to complete the online survey.  The average age of the respondents was 36 (Min = 16; 
Max = 79; SD = 13.0), 60 percent of respondents were female, and 46 percent had at least a four-
year college education. 
The focal construct in Study 2 was the six-item Revised Life Orientation Test or LOT 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994).  Life orientation data have been used previously in studying 
reversed item method effects (e.g., Maydeu-Olivares & Coffman, 2006; McPherson & Mohr, 
2005).  Three items measured life orientation in a positive direction: ‘In uncertain times, I 
usually expect the best’; ‘I'm always optimistic about my future’; ‘Overall, I expect more good 
things to happen to me than bad’ (p1 to p3).  Three items measured life orientation in a negative 
direction and were thus reversed: ‘If something can go wrong for me, it will’; ‘I hardly ever 
expect things to go my way’; ‘I rarely count on good things happening to me’ (n1 to n3).  For the 
grouped-massed condition, we used two additional items (both from the original LOT scale; 
Scheier & Carver, 1985), either ‘I always look on the bright side of things’ for the regular item 
first condition (p4) or ‘Things never work out the way I want them to’ for the reversed item first 
condition (n4).  All items were rated on 5-point Likert scales with endpoints of strongly disagree 
(1) and strongly agree (5).  
To measure NARS, we included 16 items identified by Greenleaf (1992) as being highly 
diverse in content, which are thus well suited for capturing response style variance.  Greenleaf 
(1992) originally proposed the items as a scale for measuring extreme response style, but the 
heterogeneity of the items in terms of substantive content serves our purpose as well.  Based on a 
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preliminary screening of the items for potential content relations with life orientation, we deleted 
three items (‘No matter how fast our income goes up, we never seem to get ahead’; ‘Investing in 
the stock market is too risky for most families’; ‘I will probably have more money to spend next 
year than I have now’) and replaced them with three items that are sometimes included as filler 
items among the life orientation items (i.e., ‘I enjoy my friends a lot’; ‘It's important for me to 
keep busy’; ‘It's easy for me to relax’; see Scheier et al., 1994).  To construct the NARS measure, 
we computed the average score across the 16 unrelated buffer items (Min = 1.00, Max = 5.00, 
M = 3.31, SD = .85, Cronbach’s alpha = .42).  The reliability of the composite was relatively 
low, but this is not entirely surprising given that the scale contains only 16 items and the items in 
the scale were specifically selected to share no substantive content.  Watson (1992) reported 
comparable reliabilities in her study.   
We used six versions of the questionnaire, corresponding to the six conditions in Study 1. 
In the grouped-alternated conditions (N = 204), the six LOT items were shown on the same page 
in an alternating sequence, starting with either a regular or reversed item.  In the grouped-massed 
conditions (N = 186), the LOT items were also shown on the same page, but four regular items 
were followed by three reversed items (in the regular item first condition) or four reversed items 
were followed by three regular items (in the reversed item first condition).  In both the grouped-
alternated and grouped-massed conditions, the buffer items were shown on four separate pages 
with four items per page, counterbalancing whether the buffer items preceded or followed the 
LOT items.  Counterbalancing had no effect on the results, so it is not considered as a design 
factor in the sequel.  In the dispersed conditions (N = 205), each LOT item was shown on a 
separate page, and on each page the LOT item was followed by buffer items (i.e., on the first five 
pages, the LOT item was followed by three buffer items, and on the last page the LOT item was 
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followed by one buffer item, for a total of 16 buffer items).  Depending on the ‘First item 
reversed’ (FIR) condition, the survey started with a regular or reversed item. 
After the LOT and buffer items, we included eight items measuring frugality, all worded 
in the same direction (Lastovicka et al., 1999). These eight items were intended as a 
manipulation to induce the erroneous expectation among careless respondents that all items on 
this page measured the same underlying construct.  However, the last item on this page served as 
an IMC and read, “For this statement, please do not check a response option, but simply click on 
the continue button below”. Participants who clicked on one of the response options were coded 
as having failed the IMC (IMC=1), all others as having passed it (IMC=0; see Oppenheimer, 
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).  Only 4.2 percent of respondents failed the IMC. 
Results 
The distribution of the data was again sufficiently normal (all endogenous observed 
variables had skewness and kurtosis values between –1 and +1) and there were no missing 
values, so we used the ML estimator in MPlus 6.1. We started with a one-factor model in which 
the six observed variables loaded on a single substantive factor (LOT) and all estimated 
parameters were left unconstrained across the three item-arrangement conditions.  This model fit 
quite poorly (χ2 (27) = 320.50, p < .0001; RMSEA = .234; CFI = .862; TLI = .769); the sizable 
modification indices for the covariances of the unique factors again suggested the presence of 
reversed item bias.   
We then estimated the full model shown in Figure 2.  The loadings on the substantive 
factor were freely estimated across items (except for one unit loading for the marker item), but as 
in the previous study the loadings of corresponding items proved to be invariant across items 
arrangement conditions and were therefore constrained to be equal across groups.  The loadings 
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on the consistency bias and confirmation bias factors were set to plus or minus unity, as shown in 
Figure 2.  No covariances between any of the exogenous variables had to be introduced. 
To test for the invariance of the γ parameters across the three item arrangement 
conditions, we conducted a series of model comparison tests.  In support of the prediction that 
the effect of acquiescence on inconsistency bias would not depend on the positioning of the 
items in the questionnaire, γNARS was invariant across groups (∆χ2 (2) = .02, n.s.).  Contrary to 
predictions, the effects of IMC (carelessness) and the keying direction of the first item (FIR) 
were also invariant (∆χ2 (2) = .51, n.s., for γIMC and ∆χ2 (2) = 4.10, n.s., for γConfbias).  The final 
model, in which all the γ parameters were specified to be invariant across groups, fit the data 
well, although the chi-square statistic was significant: χ2 (94) = 150.08, p = .0002; RMSEA = 
.055 (90% C.I. .038 to .071); SRMR = .062; CFI = .974; TLI = .973.  The estimation results are 
shown in Table 1. 
NARS (γNARS = .33, p < .001) and IMC (γIMC = .31, p < .001) were highly significant 
determinants of inconsistency bias, supporting our predictions that both net acquiescence and 
careless responding would contribute to response inconsistency between regular and reversed 
items.  The invariance of the effect of NARS on inconsistency bias was as expected, but contrary 
to prediction, the effect of IMC did not differ by item arrangement condition.  The manipulation 
of whether or not the first target item was reversed (FIR) had no effect on responses to the LOT 
items, and there were no moderating effects of item arrangement.  Thus, the hypotheses 
concerning confirmation bias were not supported in this study.  The residual variance in the 
inconsistency bias factor was significant after accounting for NARS and IMC, which could mean 
that NARS and IMC do not fully capture acquiescence and careless responding, respectively, or 
that there are other influences on inconsistent responding besides acquiescence and carelessness.   
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The variance decomposition shown in Table 2 indicates that the substantive construct 
accounts for the largest portion of the variance in each observed item, although the proportions 
are smaller than in Study 1, particularly for the regular items.  Even though the regular items 
contain somewhat less content variance than the reversed items, it should be noted that the labels 
‘reversed’ and ‘regular’ are basically interchangeable as they depend on the way the construct is 
labeled (i.e., optimism vs. pessimism).  
While the effects of NARS and IMC on inconsistency bias were highly significant, the 
variance proportions accounted for by acquiescence and careless responding were relatively 
minor (especially the latter).  However, the residual of the inconsistency bias factor is a non-
negligible contributor to observed item scores, similar in magnitude to Study 1 (with the 
exception of the grouped-massed condition).  If we take the average variance proportion for 
NARS, IMC, and the residual in the inconsistency bias factor and set it in proportion to the 
relative substantive variance, the proportions are .13 in Study 1 and .14 in Study 2.  In other 
words, the contribution of the substantive construct to the variability in observed scores is about 
7 to 8 times greater than that of inconsistency bias.  Interestingly, the unique factor component is 
much stronger in Study 2 than in Study 1.  This may be due to the fact that the items used in 
Study 2 were less similar than those used in Study 1.   
DISCUSSION 
The issue of whether or not reverse-keyed items should be included in measurement 
scales has been controversial.  Some measurement experts recommend the routine use of items 
varying in keying direction, others advise against it.  In this paper we contribute to the literature 
on reversed items in four ways.  First, we distinguish three distinct mechanisms through which 
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reversed items can affect survey participants’ responses (acquiescence, careless responding, and 
confirmation bias), and we discuss two sets of factors that may influence the extent to which 
these mechanisms operate (how the items measuring the focal construct are arranged in the 
questionnaire and whether the survey starts with a regular or reversed item).  Second, we offer a 
review and classification of previous attempts to model method effects caused by the presence of 
reversed items.  Third, we propose a multi-sample factor-analytic model containing two method 
factors (inconsistency bias, confirmation bias), which allows researchers to simultaneously 
investigate the operation of the three mechanisms in response to reversed items.  Fourth, we 
report two empirical studies to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed model and to provide 
evidence about the importance of the three sources of method bias under various conditions.  The 
conditions studied were selected to reflect realistic variations in the way questionnaires are 
administered in practice rather than to maximize the biases of interest.  Of course, the model can 
be applied to other situations in future research in order to further investigate the misresponse 
mechanisms studied in the current research. 
We believe that the proposed model has several attractive features.  In a general sense, 
our approach combines aspects of experimentation with response style measurement in order to 
gain additional insights into people’s responses to questionnaires containing reverse-keyed items.  
Respondents are randomly assigned to surveys that vary how the focal items are distributed over 
the questionnaire and whether the first focal item is a regular or reverse-keyed item.  We use a 
dedicated measure of net acquiescence response style based on many heterogeneous items and an 
explicit assessment of careless responding (in Study 2) to separate different mechanisms that 
might lead to inconsistency bias.  The manipulation of whether the first measure of the target 
construct is a regular or reversed item makes it possible to examine the presence of confirmation 
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bias.  The inclusion of antecedents of inconsistency bias and confirmation bias enhances the 
interpretability of the method factors, which has been a problem in some prior research.  Finally, 
the multi-sample specification of the three types of item arrangement (grouped-alternated, 
grouped-massed, and dispersed) allows us to investigate the moderating influence of item 
positioning on the effect of acquiescence, careless responding, and the ‘First item reversed’ 
(FIR) manipulation on item scores.  Although a six-group specification corresponding to the 
three item arrangements by two FIR conditions is feasible as well, especially when the sample 
size per condition is relatively large, we used the simpler three-group specification with a 
dummy variable representing the FIR manipulation because it sufficed to test the hypotheses 
implied by our conceptualization.  
The findings of both studies clearly show that inconsistency bias is an important 
component of variation in observed measures of constructs, accounting for about 9 percent of the 
variance in Study 1 and 8 percent of the variance in Study 2 on average.  If inconsistency bias 
were ignored, the fit of factor models would be rather poor, because the error introduced by the 
presence of reversed items is systematic.  Although inconsistency bias has been demonstrated in 
previous research, we have attempted to move beyond prior work by identifying different 
sources of inconsistency bias.  In particular, the two studies show that both acquiescence and 
careless responding contribute to inconsistency bias.  Although the variance proportions 
accounted for by explicit measures of acquiescence (NARS) and careless responding (IMC) were 
small, this will not always be the case.  For example, in the second study only 4 percent of 
respondents failed the IMC, whereas Oppenheimer et al. (2009) report failure rates of 14 to 46 
percent in their studies.  If a greater proportion of respondents had been careless, it is likely that 
careless responding would have been a more important contributor to inconsistency bias.  
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Acquiescence is sometimes treated as being synonymous with inconsistency bias (i.e., 
simultaneous agreement with regular and reversed items), but we have argued for a more limited 
interpretation of (net) acquiescence as a preference for the positive or negative side of the rating 
scale (i.e., the response options indicating agreement or disagreement on a Likert scale), because 
inconsistency bias may be due to other mechanisms besides acquiescence (e.g., careless 
responding).  From this perspective, acquiescence is best measured as the extent of agreement 
with items that are heterogeneous in content (i.e., NARS).  In our studies, NARS was a 
statistically significant but practically minor component of item scores.  Possible reasons for this 
may be that respondents had well-established beliefs about the target constructs (self-esteem and 
optimism), that the questions were relatively straightforward, and that the survey did not impose 
undue demands on people’s limited cognitive abilities.  If a survey deals with issues about which 
respondents are less certain, the items are more ambiguous, and the questionnaire is completed 
under peripheral processing conditions, acquiescence is likely to be a more important 
determinant of observed responses.  Survey researchers cannot control whether respondents have 
crystallized opinions about the focal concept, but they can avoid vaguely worded items and 
encourage respondents to engage in systematic processing.  If these strategies are insufficient to 
prevent acquiescence, post hoc controls should be built into the questionnaire.  For example, 
balanced scales consisting of an equal number of regular and reversed items should be used, or 
unrelated items should be included that enable the formation of an explicit measure of 
acquiescence (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001).   
Careless responding means that respondents tend to assume that the keying direction of 
an item is the same as the keying direction of the items preceding it in a scale.  Because of its 
contextual nature, careless responding was hypothesized to be especially problematic in the 
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grouped-massed condition, where reversed items are preceded by several regular items (or vice 
versa).  We did not find conclusive evidence in support of this hypothesis, possibly because of 
the small number of careless responders in our data.  If future research were to corroborate the 
hypothesized effect, it would imply that researchers should refrain from using unbalanced scales, 
in which a few reversed items are included among many regular items (possibly to counter the 
criticism that all items are keyed in the same direction).  In particular, reversed items should not 
follow a long list of regular items as this may lead respondents to overlook variation in item 
polarity (Drolet & Morrison, 2001).  Although the empirical evidence is currently somewhat 
ambiguous, we believe the best option is to disperse the items measuring the focal construct 
across the questionnaire and to mix them with unrelated buffer items.  We recognize that this is 
more taxing for respondents (thus requiring greater involvement in the task) and may result in 
larger unique item variances and possibly lower reliability (as shown in Study 1).  If this is 
undesirable and/or if the items measuring the same construct need to be grouped for other 
reasons (e.g., for the sake of the logical flow of the questionnaire), researchers should at least use 
balanced scales and alternate the keying direction of the items in the scale (i.e., switch between 
regular and reverse-keyed items).  
Even after explicitly accounting for both acquiescence (using a direct NARS measure) 
and carelessness (as measured by an instructional manipulation check), most of the variance in 
the inconsistency bias factor remained unexplained in Study 2.  There are several possible 
explanations for this.  First, the empirical measures used probably did not fully capture 
acquiescence and carelessness.  Second, important components of either acquiescence or 
carelessness may be scale-specific and can therefore not be measured in a general way across 
different scales.  Third, other psychological mechanisms that lead to inconsistent responding to 
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regular versus reversed items may be at work, which were not considered in the current model.  
More research is needed to further explore these possibilities. 
In addition to leading to inconsistent responses to items, variation in the keying direction 
of items may also affect the mean response to these items.  Specifically, we hypothesized that 
confirmation bias would cause a mean shift in the direction of the keying of the first item 
encountered in the questionnaire (i.e., upward bias when a regular item comes first, downward 
bias when a reversed item comes first, after recoding), particularly in the two grouped 
conditions.  Our empirical findings concerning confirmation bias were inconclusive, as the 
regression parameter had a wide confidence interval that came close to but did not include zero 
in Study 1 and a wide confidence interval centered about zero in Study 2.  Kunda et al. (1993) 
showed that the direction of the question (e.g., being extraverted vs. being introverted) made a 
difference when respondents were able to retrieve information consistent with either position. 
When prior evidence consistently supported only one pole of the question, or when respondents 
rated themselves as low in variability across situations on the construct of interest, the wording 
of the question had no effect.  In addition, in order for confirmation bias to be evident, 
respondents should not have an overall summary judgment readily available in memory (in 
which case the piecemeal retrieval of information is unnecessary), and they have to be 
sufficiently motivated to retrieve additional information in response to individual questions.  If 
these conditions do not hold, confirmation bias is unlikely to emerge.  Apparently, biased 
retrieval was not very strong in our studies, but future research should investigate when 
confirmation bias can be expected to have a more pronounced influence on the results.   
Several findings were inconsistent between the two studies, but this is not entirely 
surprising because the two studies varied in many respects and should be thought of as 
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illustrative applications of the model to two different situations, not as simple replications.  Study 
1 used four ad hoc items that were rather similar in content and wording, so that respondents may 
have perceived the items to be somewhat redundant.  This could be one of the reasons for the 
relatively low proportion of unique variance in the items.  Study 2 used more items, and although 
the items came from a validated scale, they were less obviously similar, which probably 
increased the amount of unique variance.  Study 1 used a seven-point rating scale, whereas Study 
2 used a five-point rating scale.  The former format has been found to result in greater 
misresponse (Weijters, Cabooter, & Schillewaert, 2010).  The respondents and the assessment 
environment were also quite different.  The first study used European participants who had 
agreed to be part of a nationally representative panel, whereas the second study was conducted 
with American respondents willing to answer some questions for a small payment.  The first 
sample is quite experienced in filling out surveys and respondents may be more sophisticated in 
their use of rating scales, which may encourage confirmation biases and reduce acquiescence.  
We anticipated a relatively high rate of inattentive responding in the second sample, based on 
prior findings with similar populations (e.g., Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), but 
respondents were surprisingly attentive, which may account for the weak effect of careless 
responding and the near-absence of confirmation bias.  Future research should investigate 
situations in which the three response biases studied in this paper are expected to have a stronger 
effect on the results.  Our goal in the current studies was to simulate realistic variation in survey 
designs, but there will be conditions in which the three biases are expected to be stronger.  We 
also want to emphasize that the main contribution of this research is not the empirical studies but 
the proposal of a general analysis strategy for investigating different sources of reversed item 
bias integrating response style measurement with survey design manipulations. 
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There are two primary ways in which a regular item can be reversed.  On the one hand, 
the meaning of an item can be switched by using a negation (e.g., by inserting the particle ‘not’).  
On the other hand, a reversal can be achieved by using an antonymic expression (see Bentler, 
Jackson, & Messick, 1971; Schriesheim et al., 1991).  Research has shown that negations can be 
confusing to respondents (see Swain et al., 2008, for some recent evidence) and should probably 
be used sparingly.  In our studies, we did not use reversed items based on particle negations 
(‘not’), but future research should investigate to what extent our findings can be generalized to 
negated reversals (e.g., items that are reversed simply by adding ‘not’), and how the type of 
reversal influences the misresponse mechanisms studied in this paper (see Weijters and 
Baumgartner, forthcoming, for an extended conceptual discussion of some of these issues). 
Another topic that may merit further research is the question of the longitudinal stability 
of the different effects found in the present cross-sectional investigation.  The literature suggests 
that acquiescence has a stable component (Alessandri et al., 2012; Weijters, Geuens, & 
Schillewaert, 2010), but less is known about the longitudinal stability of careless responding to 
reversed items and confirmation bias.  Some recent work has extended the traditional method-
factor and correlated-uniqueness models to a longitudinal context (Geiser & Lockhart, 2012), 
and it would be interesting to consider similar extensions of the proposed model incorporating 
multiple sources of reversed item bias.   
Some researchers have recommended that problems caused by reversed items can be 
avoided altogether if only items keyed in one direction are used to measure a target construct.  
We want to emphasize that this is not a valid argument supporting the elimination of reversed 
items from measurement scales.  When all items are worded in the same direction, acquiescence, 
careless responding, and confirmation bias may still be present, but the method effects generated 
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by these mechanisms are completely confounded with content variance and may become 
undetectable, unless direct measures of the method effects of interest are available (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003).  Although it is best not to have method effects at all, it is better to be aware of them 
and to be able to take corrective action rather than to ignore them completely.  
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Table 1 
Estimation Results (Studies 1 and 2) 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 
Parameter Estimate 95% C.I. Estimate 95% C.I. 
 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
γNARS 0.168 0.045 0.291 0.329 0.245 0.413 
γIMC n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.306 0.163 0.449 
σ²Z 0.166 0.093 0.239 0.060 0.036 0.084 
0.367 0.244 0.490 0.083 0.056 0.110 
0.097 0.019 0.175 0.076 0.049 0.103 
γConfbias -0.285 -0.567 -0.003 0.000 -0.131 0.131 
σ2(ξ) 1.736 1.185 2.287 0.393 0.283 0.503 
1.585 1.064 2.106 0.569 0.410 0.728 
1.505 1.007 2.003 0.419 0.303 0.535 
σ2(NARS) 0.280 0.206 0.354 0.112 0.090 0.134 
0.262 0.188 0.336 0.122 0.097 0.147 
0.289 0.211 0.367 0.114 0.092 0.136 
σ2(IMC) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.060 0.048 0.072 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.026 0.020 0.032 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.033 0.027 0.039 
σ2(FIR) 0.247 0.180 0.314 0.250 0.201 0.299 
0.250 0.179 0.321 0.250 0.199 0.301 
0.245 0.178 0.312 0.250 0.201 0.299 
σ(ξ, ΝΑRS) -0.241 -0.386 -0.096 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
-0.233 -0.374 -0.092 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
-0.222 -0.363 -0.081 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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Table 1 continued 
 
 Study 1 Study 2 
Parameter Estimate 95% C.I. Estimate 95% C.I. 
 
 
Lower Upper 
 
Lower Upper 
λp1 1.000 n.a. n.a. 1.000 n.a. n.a. 
λp2 1.059 0.971 1.147 1.120 0.998 1.242 
λp3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.170 1.048 1.292 
λn1 -0.981 -1.106 -0.856 -1.169 -1.314 -1.024 
λn2 -1.070 -1.199 -0.941 -1.348 -1.501 -1.195 
λn3 n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.366 -1.523 -1.209 
σ² (εp1) 0.393 0.211 0.575 0.501 0.385 0.617 
0.376 0.166 0.586 0.427 0.319 0.535 
0.688 0.423 0.953 0.459 0.351 0.567 
σ² (εp2) 0.286 0.110 0.462 0.468 0.356 0.580 
0.213 0.013 0.413 0.331 0.239 0.423 
0.464 0.227 0.701 0.372 0.276 0.468 
σ² (εp3) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.296 0.210 0.382 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.326 0.232 0.420 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.308 0.222 0.394 
σ² (εn1) 0.413 0.217 0.609 0.409 0.313 0.505 
0.267 0.091 0.443 0.333 0.249 0.417 
0.873 0.552 1.194 0.402 0.306 0.498 
σ² (εn2) 0.425 0.213 0.637 0.240 0.166 0.314 
0.207 0.023 0.391 0.213 0.142 0.284 
0.657 0.359 0.955 0.253 0.175 0.331 
σ² (εn3) n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.311 0.227 0.395 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.260 0.182 0.338 
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.354 0.260 0.448 
 
Note:  95% C.I. = 95% confidence interval; Lower = lower bound; Upper = upper bound.  
NARS = net acquiescence response style; IMC = instruction manipulation check; FIR = First 
Item Reversed dummy variable; see Figure 2 for an explanation of the other parameter 
names.  In case of multiple cell entries for a given parameter, the first line refers to the 
grouped-alternated condition, the second to the grouped-massed condition, and the third to 
the dispersed condition. 
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Table 2 
Variance decomposition for regular and reversed items (Studies 1 and 2) 
Variance component Study 1  Study 2 
 
Average of  
regular items 
 Average of  
reversed items 
 Average of  
regular items 
 Average of  
reversed items 
 GA GM DIS  GA GM DIS  GA GM DIS  GA GM DIS 
Substantive construct (ξ) .804 .734 .719  .724 .701 .621  .487 .599 .518  .624 .723 .622 
 [.729, [.647, [.625,  [.651, [.623, [.529,  [.421, [.536, [.453  [.564 [.671 [.562, 
 .878] .822] .813]  .798] .779] .714]  .553] .663] .583]  .685 .775] .682] 
NARS .003 .003 .004  .003 .003 .003  .012 .012 .013  .011 .010 .011 
 [-.002, [-.002, [-.002,  [-.002, [-.002, [-.002,  [.005, [.005, [.006,  [.005, [.004, [.005, 
 .009] .008] .009]  .009] .008] .008]  .019] .018] .020]  .018] .016] .017] 
IMC n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a.  .006 .002 .003  .005 .002 .003 
         [.000, [.000, [.000,  [.000, [.000, [.000, 
         .011] .004] .006]  .010] .004] .005] 
Residual of inconsistency  
bias factor (σ²Z) 
.073 .160 .044  .066 .154 .038  .062 .072 .078  .057 .063 .067 
[.038, [.103, [.008,  [.035, [.098, [.007,  [.037, [.047, [.050.  [.033, [.040, [.043, 
.107] .218] .080]  .097] .210] .067]  .087] .098] .106]  .080] .085] .091] 
FIR .009 .009 .009  .008 .009 .008  .000 .000 .000  .000 .000 .000 
 [-.009, [-.009, [-.009,  [-.008, [-.009, [-.008,  [.000, [.000, [.000,  [.000, [.000, [.000, 
 .026] .027] .027]  .024] .026] .023]  .000] .000] .000]  .000] .000] .000] 
Unique variances (σ2(εi)) .148 .129 .259  .166 .099 .300  .433 .315 .389  .302 .203 .297 
 [.098, [.085, [.178,  [.111, [.064, [.210,  [.369, [.259, [.329,  [.249, [.161, [.245, 
 .198] .173] .341]  .221] .135] .389]  .496] .371] .449]  .355] .244] .349] 
Covariance of NARS and ξ  -.036 -.035 -.035  .033 .034 .030  n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
[-.070, [-.068, [-.068,  [.004, [.004, [.003,         
-.002] -.002] -.001]  .062] .063] .057] 
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Note.  The numbers between brackets are the lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals. GA = grouped-alternated condition; GM 
= grouped-massed condition; DIS = dispersed condition. NARS = net acquiescence response style; IMC = instruction manipulation check; FIR = 
First Item Reversed dummy variable; see Figure 2 for an explanation of the other terms in the first column. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
 
Captions for Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1.  Method factor models described in the literature. X and Y are substantive 
latent factors; M1 and M2 are method factors. The unique terms are indicated by 
arrows leading to the items, but they are not labeled explicitly and their variances are 
not shown for simplicity. Items p1 to p6 are regular (non-reversed items); items n1 to 
n6 are reversed items. If the loadings are set to unity (freely estimated but constrained 
to be equal across items), the corresponding factor variance is freely estimated (set to 
unity).  All method factor loadings are assumed to be positive.  
 
 
Captions for Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2. Graphical depiction of the proposed integrated model of reversed item bias 
for a specific item configuration. ξ = substantive construct; η1 = inconsistency bias; 
NARS = net acquiescence response style; IMC = instruction manipulation check; Z = 
other influences on inconsistency bias; η2 = confirmation bias; FIR = First Item 
Reversed dummy variable. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR STUDY 1 
The model of Study 1 can be specified as follows: 
 p1 =  (+)  ξ  + η1 + η2 + εp1 
 p2 =   (+) λp2 ξ  + η1 + η2 + εp2 
 n1 =   (–) λn1 ξ  + η1 – η2 + εn1 
 n2 =   (–) λn2 ξ  + η1 – η2 + εn2 
 η1 = γNARS NARS + Z 
 η2 = γConfbias FIR 
See Figure 2 in the paper for variable labels. 
Although not shown explicitly, the model is a three-group specification for the 
grouped-alternated, grouped-massed and dispersed conditions.  In the final model of 
Table 1, group-invariant parameters are estimated for λp2, λn1, λn2, γNARS and γConfbias 
and group-specific parameters are estimated for σ2(ξ), σ2(NARS), σ2(FIR), σ2(εp1), 
σ2(εp2), σ2(εn1), σ2(εn2), σ(ξ, NARS), and σ2(Z). The last term is the residual variance 
in η1, which is interpreted as the variation in careless responding in Study 1.  The total 
number of parameters estimated is thus 32, and since there are 63 distinct variances 
and covariances across the three conditions, the model has 31 degrees of freedom.  
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MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR STUDY 2 
The model of Study 2 can be specified as follows:  
 p1 = (+) ξ + η1 + η2 + εp1 
 p2 = (+) λp2 ξ  + η1 + η2 + εp2 
 p3 = (+) λp3 ξ  + η1 + η2 + εp3 
 n1 = (–) λn1 ξ  + η1 – η2 + εn1 
 n2 = (–) λn2 ξ  + η1 – η2 + εn2 
 n3 = (–) λn3 ξ  + η1 – η2 + εn3 
 η1 = γNARS NARS + γIMC IMC + Z 
 η2 = γConfbias FIR 
See Figure 2 in the paper for variable labels. 
Although not shown explicitly, the model is a three-group specification for the 
grouped-alternated, grouped-massed and dispersed conditions.  In the final model of 
Table 1, group-invariant parameters are estimated for λp2, λp3, λn1, λn2, λn3, γNARS, 
γIMC, and γConfbias, and condition-specific parameters are estimated for σ2(ξ), 
σ2(NARS), σ2(IMC), σ2(FIR), σ2(εp1), σ2(εp2), σ2(εp3), σ2(εn1), σ2(εn2), σ2(εn3), and 
σ2(Z).  σ2(Z) is the residual variance in η1, after controlling for NARS and IMC.  The 
total number of parameters estimated is thus 41, and since there are 135 distinct 
variances and covariances across the three conditions, the model has 94 degrees of 
freedom. 
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 ITEM DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY CONDITION (STUDY 1) 
 
 
 
 
variance-covariance matrix 
 
 
M p1 n1 p2 n2 FIR NARS 
GA p1 4.811 2.288 
     
n1 3.085 -1.774 2.536 
    p2 4.755 1.925 -1.693 2.244 
   
n2 3.274 -1.624 2.167 -1.704 2.620 
  
FIR 0.443 -0.001 0.019 -0.043 0.125 0.249 
 NARS -0.553 -0.191 0.272 -0.245 0.324 0.038 0.282 
GM p1 4.562 2.207      
n1 3.042 -1.129 2.314     
p2 4.740 1.990 -1.357 2.384    
n2 3.010 -1.269 2.189 -1.492 2.558   
FIR 0.510 -0.09 0.073 -0.139 0.026 0.253  
NARS -0.498 -0.135 0.290 -0.183 0.328 -0.014 0.265 
DIS p1 4.712 2.324      
n1 2.933 -1.214 2.199     
p2 4.750 1.714 -1.299 2.267    
n2 3.038 -1.698 1.692 -1.796 2.814   
FIR 0.433 -0.117 0.185 -0.066 0.061 0.248  
NARS -0.426 -0.173 0.225 -0.197 0.302 -0.006 0.292 
 
Note.  GA = Grouped-alternated condition (N = 106); GM = Grouped-massed 
condition (N = 96); DIS = dispersed condition (N = 104).  
52 
 
 
  
ITEM DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY CONDITION (STUDY 2) 
 
   Variance-covariance matrix 
  
Mean p1 n1 p2 n2 p1 n3 FIR NARS IMC 
 
GA 
 
p1 
 
3.137 
 
1.045         
n1 3.078 -0.349 1.009 
       
p2 3.373 0.643 -0.429 1.062 
      
n2 3.255 -0.462 0.724 -0.506 1.087 
     
p3 3.623 0.530 -0.498 0.550 -0.540 0.857 
    
n3 3.314 -0.494 0.645 -0.518 0.826 -0.533 1.093 
   
FIR 0.505 -0.030 0.025 0.003 0.070 -0.050 0.016 0.251   
NARS 3.458 0.071 0.024 0.064 0.013 0.060 0.007 -0.011 0.112 
 
IMC 0.064 0.016 0.035 0.011 0.036 0.000 0.030 -0.003 0.011 0.060 
 
          
GM p1 3.022 1.135 
        
n1 3.301 -0.621 1.228 
       
p2 3.242 0.854 -0.667 1.233 
      
n2 3.333 -0.620 0.991 -0.730 1.283 
     
p3 3.586 0.766 -0.799 0.890 -0.787 1.239 
    
n3 3.403 -0.629 0.964 -0.745 1.086 -0.914 1.355 
   
FIR 0.505 0.076 -0.004 0.110 -0.014 0.043 -0.001 0.251   
NARS 3.452 0.082 0.004 0.109 -0.016 0.079 -0.021 0.015 0.123 
 
IMC 0.027 0.005 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.016 0.003 0.004 0.026 
           
DIS p1 3.137 1.001 
        
n1 3.298 -0.346 1.014 
       
p2 3.332 0.675 -0.401 1.036 
      
n2 3.337 -0.429 0.777 -0.471 1.146 
     
p3 3.517 0.556 -0.448 0.627 -0.600 0.957 
    
n3 3.317 -0.486 0.655 -0.615 0.858 -0.703 1.188 
   
FIR 0.512 -0.021 0.001 -0.014 -0.003 -0.011 0.001 0.251   
NARS 3.392 0.053 0.029 0.083 0.015 0.049 -0.021 -0.008 0.114 
 
IMC 0.034 0.005 0.010 0.008 0.031 0.007 0.011 -0.003 -0.001 0.033 
 
 
Note.  GA = Grouped-alternated condition (N = 204); GM = Grouped-massed 
condition (N = 205); DIS = Dispersed condition (N = 205).  
